The Baloney Detective

Augustine of Hippo (354 – 430 CE) is a good example of the religious corruption of common sense and higher-order intelligence, the corruption of common sense and higher-order intelligence due to the bewitching influence of irrational religious beliefs!

Many of the strange, or even absurd, questions he raises, e.g., whether Jesus still bears the scars of crucifixion in the palms of his hands, not to mention the “answers” he contrives for them, e.g., that Jesus still bears the scars of crucifixion in the palms of his hands, but that they are faint and not unseemly to look at, bear eloquent testimony to the extent of this corruption.

In reading his Confessions, it is essential to know that he had once founded a school of rhetoric in Carthage! The bewitchment this work can cast on our minds, the sickly obsession with “sin” and the attendant manifestations of self-loathing and even misanthropy, or loathing of humanity, it invariably tends to foster in us,  owe a great deal to the author’s masterly use of rhetoric in the service of Christian dogmas and fanatic moralism.  (Although Augustine mentions, in Books IV and V of his Confessions, that he taught rhetoric or the art of public speaking and disavows that he had any “evil intent” in teaching the art of persuasion, he betrays not even a glimmer of self-reflection or self-questioning as to whether he is using this art in his books to persuade others to accept Christian dogmas even in the face of absence of evidence, or worse, in the face of contrary evidence!)

Let’s start with his claim that babies who have not yet acquired language still feel and display the emotion of envy or jealousy.

Here is the erudite Bishop of Hippo Regius unabashedly “dishing out” baloney on the sins of babies:

“Hear me, O God! How wicked are the sins of men! Men say this and you pity them, because you made man, but you did not make sin in him.  Who can recall to me the sins I committed as a baby? For in your sight no man is free from sin, not even a child who has lived only one day on earth…What sins, then, did I commit when I was a baby myself? Was it a sin to cry when I wanted to feed on the breast?

I have myself seen jealousy in a baby and know what it means. He was not old enough to talk, but whenever he saw his foster-brother at the breast, he would grow pale with envy. This much is common knowledge…but surely it cannot be called innocence, when the milk flows in such abundance from its source, to object to a rival desperately in need and depending for his life on this one form of nourishment? Such faults are not small or unimportant…because the same faults are intolerable in older persons.” (Confessions, Book. 1: 7, Penguin Classics)

At the outset, it is worth taking note of two important truths pertaining to the claims in these passages.

First, instead of examining the evidence or the facts pertaining to babies with an unbiased mind, which would only befit a truth seeker, and then forming his conclusions, Augustine merely turns his jaundiced eyes,  jaundiced with the prior belief that no human being, not even a child who has lived only one day on earth, is free from sin, on babies, including, obviously, the baby he is talking about.

Consequently, no “leap of thought”, no arduous intellectual labor, is required to draw the conclusion that baby X, “observed” by Augustine, must be sinful and display the manifestations of that sinfulness, e.g., jealousy. No wonder, then, that Augustine thinks he has “seen jealousy” in that baby!

Thus, contrary to appearances generated by his manipulative rhetoric, he is not presenting any evidence gathered in an unbiased manner on the nature of babies. He has the prior conviction or “faith” that all babies are sinful and merely deduces from this conviction that baby X must have grown “pale with envy” because it turned pale at the sight of his foster-brother at the breast.

We may well be dealing here with an instance of intellectual perversion, the twisting, or concoction, of evidence to suit prior theories or beliefs. Too bad, Augustine did not have the benefit of Sherlock Holmes’ insight that ” It is a capital mistake to theorize before you have all the evidence. It biases the judgment.” (A Study in Scarlet) Nay, Holmes, it also distorts your perceptions!

At the very least, what we have here is a case of (mis) interpretation of a baby’s facial expression in terms of prior religious beliefs about its sinfulness.

Second, the distinguished Bishop of Hippo Regius does not seem to realize that his portentous and absurd conclusions on the sinfulness of babies contradict the declarations of his Savior Jesus of Nazareth.

In Matthew 19:14, it says that  “Jesus said, “Let the little children come to me and do not hinder them, for to such belongs the kingdom of heaven”. Further, in Matthew 18:3,  Jesus said  “Truly, I say to you, unless you turn and become like children, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven”.

Clearly, the import of these remarks by Jesus is that little children are innocent and constitute, in this respect, models for adults aspiring to travel to the final destination of  “the Kingdom of Heaven”.

In the view of Jesus, children are innocent of sin. How, then, could Bishop Augustine bring himself to blatantly contradict the claims of his Savior and assert that even babies who have lived only one day on earth are guilty of sins such as jealousy and the will to inflict harm on  people taking care of them?

Let us now examine whether it is plausible to ascribe or impute jealousy to babies who have not even acquired a language.

Obviously, we need a correct account of jealousy in order to determine whether it makes any sense to ascribe it to babies bereft of language.

Spinoza pointed out in his Ethics (Part III) that envy is not a primitive or simple emotion. It is a compound or complex emotion. It is  a form of hatred constituted by pain at someone’s good fortune and pleasure at that person’s misfortune. As Spinoza put it: “Envy is hatred in so far as it induces a man to be pained by another’s good fortune and to rejoice in another’s evil fortune.” (Ethics, Book III: XXIII) Hence, according to Spinoza, envy is opposed to sympathy whose nature consists in taking pleasure at someone’s good fortune and pain at someone’s misfortune.

Hume pointed out in his Treatise Of Human Nature (Book II: Sec. VIII) that envy arises from comparison of one’s condition with that of another not distant from one’s social station. Hume thinks that a great gulf between one’s condition and that of another, e.g., the case of a peasant and a billionaire, robs jealousy of its force, whereas the proximity of the other person’s condition to one’s own, e.g., the case of the peasant and his neighbor, accentuates the force of jealousy.

Envy arises from the fact that this comparison of my condition with that of another diminishes my sense of some good, e.g., enjoyment, I possess or have. In Hume’s words, “”Envy is excited by some present enjoyment of another, which by comparison diminishes our idea of our own“. (A Treatise Of Human Nature, Book II: Sec. VIII, Penguin Classics)

It should now start to become clear that there is something far-fetched in Augustine’s claim that a baby which has not acquired language is capable of feeling and expressing envy or jealousy at someone’s possession of a good.

Jealousy is a complex attitude. It involves the desire to possess something, X, or to possess it in an ample measure or quantity. It also involves cognitive  processes which yield the knowledge (or, at least,  the belief) that :

a) X is a good worth possessing or worth possessing in an ample measure or quantity,

AND

b) One lacks X or has it only to an insufficient degree,

AND

c) Another person possesses X or possesses it to a great(er) extent or degree than oneself

As a consequence, in a state of jealousy, there is also:

d) Ill-will, or resentment, or hatred, toward that person in possession of X and one wishes that he or she did not possess X, or did not possess it to the extent or degree greater than one’s own possession of X.

Thus, jealousy is a form of ill-will, resentment, or hatred toward those who possess goods which I desire and  which I lack or possess only to an insufficient or inadequate degree. Desire, hatred, pain, and pleasure are all the ingredients which, in a pattern of relationship, constitute jealousy.

Is it, then, plausible to claim that a baby can experience and express jealousy toward another?

If it is plausible to make this claim, then this implies that a baby is capable of comparing its condition with that of another.

But this is absurd since babies have not achieved the cognitive development, constituted to a significant extent by the acquisition and use of language, which would give them the capacity for such comparisons.

Hence, it is baloney to claim that a baby can experience and express jealousy toward another.

If it is plausible to claim that a baby can experience and express jealousy, then this implies that a baby is capable of judging something to be good.

But this is absurd since babies have not achieved the cognitive development, constituted to a significant extent by the acquisition and use of language, which would give them the capacity for such judgments.

Hence, it is baloney to claim that a baby can experience and express jealousy toward another.

If it is plausible to claim that a baby can experience and express jealousy, then this implies that a baby is capable of feeling pleasure at someone’s loss of a good (Schadenfreude in babies!!!)  and feeling pain at someone’s possession of that good.

But this is absurd since babies have not achieved the cognitive and affect development, constituted to a significant extent by the acquisition and use of language, which would give them the capacity for such emotions, e.g., Schadenfreude.

Hence, it is baloney to claim that a baby can experience and express jealousy toward another.

Augustine’s irrational religious belief that babies are guilty of sin deserves a final demolition by means of this reductio ad absurdum:

To hold that babies are guilty of sinfulness, e.g., jealousy, a will to harm those who take care of them,  etc., implies that babies can be held responsible for those sins.

If babies can be held responsible for their sins, this implies that they could have refrained, by exercising choice, from their sins. It makes no sense to hold someone responsible for a sin if that person could not have refrained from committing that sin.

But it is absurd to think that babies are capable of exercising such choices about crying for milk, or attention, (serious sins in Augustine’s view!) or whether to feel jealousy at the sight of another baby at the breast.

The reason is that they have not achieved the stage of cognitive development, constituted to a significant extent by the acquisition and use of language, which would give them the capacity for self-reflection and for making choices based on it.

Hence, it is sheer baloney to claim or believe, as Augustine does, that babies are guilty of sin.

Q.E.D.

Analytical philosophy has failed miserably to make any sort of significant impact on North American popular culture. The various popular “intellectual” forums and “discourses” in North America are replete with conceptual muddles, fallacies, and nonsense.

Libresco’s sensationalist disavowal of atheism and announcement of conversion to Catholicism is a good illustration of these features of popular “intellectual culture” in North America.

A religious conversion is not like the silly business of changing your allegiance to a new brand of clothing. It is a critical transforming event, for good or bad, marked by a close and deep encounter with death, loss, tragedy, despair, loneliness, and/or their opposites.

Libresco’s “conversion” has none of these features.

Does it then have at least a significant and redeeming  “moment of insight” underlying it? Hardly.

What transpired, on her own account, and led to her “conversion” is riddled with philosophical nonsense.

She said to a friend “I guess Morality just loves me or something.” (I should have expected that someone in North America would one day go so far as to actually personify “Morality” and include it among the persons they wish truly loved them!).

She then took “a second” to decide that she truly believed that “Morality” loved her! Spellbinding philosophical virtuosity indeed!

She goes on to add “I believed that the Moral Law wasn’t just a Platonic truth, abstract and distant.  It turns out I actually believed it was some kind of Person, as well as Truth. “

It is the trademark of bad philosophy that it uses language with no concern for what the words mean, or, worse, whether they mean anything at all.

“the Moral Law”? What is it? It’s simply a set of moral principles which imply judgments of right and wrong pertaining to human action or conduct.

To claim that a set of moral principles is “some kind of Person, as well as Truth” is utter nonsense or baloney.

And what could it possibly mean to say that a set of moral principles is or is not  “just a Platonic truth”?

What is this “Platonic truth” anyway?

There is just truth. There is no such thing as “Platonic truth”, “Aristotelian truth”, “Hegelian truth”, “Augustinian truth”, and so forth. Those are just figments of philosophical megalomania.

Perhaps, in using the expression “Platonic truth”,  Libresco is striving to refer to Plato’s bizarre metaphysical theory of “forms”  according to which “forms” or concepts exist in an unchanging world transcending the natural world.

Yes, indeed! How could particular cars possibly come into existence if there were not a “form” or concept of car subsisting changelessly in a mysterious and  unchanging world, accessible only to the “Platonic elite”, over and above this imperfect world in which those particular cars come into existence, undergo wear and tear, and are finally reduced to scrap metal in a junkyard? Right!!!

In any case, it is also utter nonsense to claim that a set of moral principles is “just a Platonic truth” or that it isn’t “just a Platonic truth”.

In Plato’s view, there is a “Form of the Good” which is the basis of all other “forms”. Our moral values and principles ultimately derive from and owe their existence to this “Form of the Good”.

Perhaps, this is the point Libresco was alluding to in the convoluted claim that “the Moral Law wasn’t just a Platonic truth”. And her claim, to render it intelligible,  is that she did not believe that our moral values and principles ultimately derive from and owe their existence to this supremely abstract “Form of the Good”.

What, then, did she believe?

Well, that our moral principles and values constitute “some kind of a Person”!

To repeat, this is just nonsense. One might as well claim that our legal and political principles and so forth are also “some kind of Persons”.

Perhaps, she intends to convey, by means of her nonsensical claims, the point that she believes that there is some kind of “Person” embodying in his nature and actions these moral values and principles?

Who is this “Person”? That’s no mystery. It has to be “God”, or perhaps, his “Only Begotten Son”, Jesus Christ!

But if one wants to play this personification game, then, given the fact that there are diverse and conflicting moral values and principles, doesn’t it make more sense to believe that there must be diverse “Persons”, or divinities, or Gods, each embodying a moral value and/or principle?

Why should one believe that there is a single “Person” who embodies diverse and conflicting moral values and principles, e.g., absolute justice and unconditional love, rather than that there are diverse “Persons” who embody different values and principles?

Why not believe that there is a God of Love, a Goddess of Justice, and so forth?

In fact, the notion that there is one “Person”, God, or Jesus Christ, who embodies in his character and actions “the Moral Law”, or diverse and conflicting moral values and principles, e.g., absolute justice and unconditional love, has the implication that this “Person” embodies contradictions and undergoes conflict, and , hence, is imperfect in his nature!!!

And an imperfect God is logically impossible in just the way a square circle is.

Therefore, Libresco’s attempt to argue for, or avow a belief  in,  the existence of a being which embodies conflicting  moral values and principles leads to the shocking conclusion that this being, even if it actually exists, cannot be the God of  theism, and particularly of Catholicism, since it would be an imperfect being!

And, in light of all this, what could one possibly say about her alleged “conversion” based on the kind of “belief “she avows?

An important question  pertaining to her “conversion” is this: Why convert to Catholicism rather than Mormonism or Protestantism? Why convert to a sect of Christianity rather than Islam? (Incidentally, I wonder about the reaction in ultra-tolerant North America had she announced a conversion to Islam!)

All of these religions hold the belief, or imply, that God is morally perfect.

Therfore, if it’s all about the notion of a being embodying moral perfection,  why should one choose Catholicism over Protestantism,  or even over Islam?

Actually, if one is driven by the need to believe in a being embodying moral perfection, then Christianity is the wrong choice!

The notion that God condemns you to eternal damnation for disbelief in “Him” is central to Christianity.

Whatever it is, such a being cannot be all-loving or morally perfect.

There are great human beings who would put this God of Catholicism to shame!

Hence, even if there is a good reason to think that there is a being, God, embodying moral perfection, this doesn’t justify conversion to Catholicism.

Notice also that if the existence of “Morality” justifies belief  in  a “Person”, God,  embodying it, then the existence of “Immorality” equally justifies belief in a “Person”, Satan, embodying it.

What a neat proof, a la Gödel,  of  the “Truth” of Catholicism!!!

“El sueño de la razón produce monstruos”

The Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters!

And, I would add, they often wear “baloney masks”!

The second noble truth suggests that reality is at least characterized by causal and dependence relations among its constitutive elements or features. To provide an analysis of  causal or dependence relations between desire and the various modes of suffering identified in widely prevalent formulations of the first noble truth is to extend these causal or dependence relations to reality. The Buddhist doctrine of paticcasamuppāda, shorn of absurd Mahayana accretions or additions such as “interdependent co-arising”, is a development of the second noble truth.

Reflection on the four noble truths raises an important question: What’s reality got to do with all this? What must the fundamental aspects of reality be like if both suffering and liberation from suffering can occur within its folds?

Since suffering is caused by desire, and, we must add, this usually requires the thwarting of desire,  reality must be such that there is no “pre-established harmony” between our desires and reality. The thwarting of our desires implies that reality can be, and often is, incompatible with our desires.  And this, in its turn, implies that reality must be independent of our desires.

Thought, memory, feeling, and volition are constitutive elements of desire. To have a desire for an ice cream is to think about it, have feelings of pleasure anticipating having an ice cream, or remembering the enjoyment of an ice cream in the past, to have a volition or will in the direction of fulfillment of the desire, etc.

So, if reality is independent of desire, it must also be independent of the constitutive elements of desire such as thought, memory, feeling, and volition. Let’s put this point in simple terms: reality must be independent of our minds!

Thus, the first and second noble truths imply and echo commonsense realism, i.e., that reality is independent of our minds, or our desires, thoughts, and feelings. So, any form of subjectivism, or “subjective  idealism”, which makes reality dependent on our minds, or our desires, thoughts, and feelings is inconsistent with the first and second noble truths! And in terms of the criterion of compatibility with the four noble truths, we must hold that subjective idealism is not a truly Buddhist teaching!

The second,third, and the fourth noble truths suggest that reality must have an underlying causal and dependence-relations structure which can be understood by human reason and that this understanding can be applied to bring about freedom from suffering. If suffering can be understood and overcome, then the reality within whose folds this occurs must be intelligible or comprehensible to human reason.

This import of the four noble truths resonates well with Einstein’s avowed astonishment that even the complex structures of reality are intelligible to or comprehensible by human reason.

So, as I have pointed out in other posts, skepticism and any denigration of the ability of human reason to comprehend reality are inconsistent with the four noble truths.

Thus, the four noble truths and science converge in on this most important feature of reality and the relation of human reason to it.

In light of these arguments, I have expanded the list of claims a truly Buddhist teaching cannot contain or countenance:

1.    Things have no inherent or essential nature.

2.    Causality or causal relations have no reality.

3.    We cannot know anything.

4.    The subject or self does not exist.

5.    Common sense is never reliable.

6.    There are no real distinctions, i.e., “non-dualism”.

7.  Rationality has no value and cannot facilitate enlightenment.

8.  There are supernatural beings.

9.  Suffering is caused by supernatural beings.

10. We can overcome suffering only with the aid of supernatural beings.

11. We have an innate, enlightened, “Buddha Nature” not subject to ignorance, desire, and suffering.

12. Reality cannot be known by human reason.

13. Reality is dependent on our minds, or our desires, thoughts, and feelings.

It would be rare to attend any presentation on Buddhism which did not  invoke the venerable “doctrine of  emptiness”. It is also a staple ingredient of any fashionable Buddhist talk, particularly at universities and colleges in North America and Europe.

Let us note at the outset that the term “emptiness” is a misnomer for what is claimed in its name. The word “emptiness” suggests a void, nothingness, or absence of any substance, content, purpose, or meaning. In fact, the Sanskrit term  “Sunyata” means just that. In ancient Indian mathematics, “sunya” was the term for “zero”. However, Buddhists and “Buddhist philosophers” who invoke the “doctrine of emptiness” vehemently insist that the doctrine means nothing of that sort.

But why then do they abuse the word “emptiness” if they mean something entirely different from the usual or standard meaning of that term?

What they mean by “emptiness” is two commonplace truths whose knowledge obviously requires no special “enlightenment”: impermanence and dependent origination. By “dependent origination”, they mean the simple fact that every entity, event, or phenomenon has a cause on which it depends. Every farmer knows these truths:  that nothing lasts forever and that chickens do not spring into existence from nothing.

We must now ask the Buddhist: “Why are you making a fuss reiterating these commonplace truths in the misleading and portentous guise of “the doctrine of emptiness”?

The Buddhist answer is that the “doctrine of emptiness” reveals a “profound truth” of the “Dharma”: reality, every object, event, or phenomenon, is  “empty” and has no inherent or essential nature. In other words, the “doctrine of emptiness” claims that  the fact that all things, events, and phenomena are impermanent and subject to dependent origination implies that nothing has any inherent or essential nature.

But didn’t the “doctrine of emptiness” just claim that all things, events, and phenomena are impermanent and subject to dependent origination? And these are not viewed as impermanent features of reality. Reality is inherently characterized by impermanence and subjection to dependent origination.  If so, then all things, events, and phenomena have an inherent or essential nature constituted by the attributes of impermanence and dependent origination!!!

So, far from dispelling any alleged delusion concerning the inherent or essential nature of things, events, or phenomena, the “doctrine of emptiness” actually affirms the contrary and implies that they do have an inherent or essential nature !

The baloney in the “doctrine of emptiness” should be evident now. It is self-refuting, inconsistent, and incoherent to claim that reality does not have an essential or inherent nature and to support this claim by the reason or premise that all things, events, and phenomena are characterized by the inherent features or attributes of  impermanence and dependent origination!!!

Note also the non sequitur in the “doctrine of emptiness”. The premise that an object, event, or phenomenon is impermanent and dependent on a cause does not support the conclusion that the object, event, or phenomenon has no inherent or essential nature or structure.

The human body clearly has a genetic essence or an essential genetic nature or structure.  It would not be human without that genetic essence or structure. And this does not presuppose or imply that the human body is eternal. Water has an essence or essential structure: H2O. This is consistent with acknowledging that water can and does undergo changes in its conditions or states.